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摘    要 





































With the establishment and perfection of Chinese capital market, capital market 
research under the Chinese special system background has attracted more and more 
attention since 1990s, in which the connections between companies and government 
called political connections have been a research focus because of the relationship 
culture prevailing in our country. In recent years, academia has done a lot of research 
on the effect of political connections. As indicated in previous studies, political 
connections, as a firm feature, have an impact on firms. For example, political 
connections could bring a company low taxation, convenient financing channels, and 
scarce resources and so on. Besides, they impacts corporate value. But they seldom 
involve the research of the relationship between companies’ political connections and 
earnings management. 
Using a sample of all private companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges from 2004 to 2008 with available data, we conduct empirical research to 
the relationship of political connections and earnings management behavior. We 
divide the political connections into two groups. If the senior executives of a company 
were government officials ever, the firm has political connections based on 
government officials. If the senior executives of a company are NPC deputy or 
members of CPPCC now, the firm has political connections based on NPC deputy or 
members of CPPCC. In this paper, we use a fictitious variable method and a scoring 
method respectively to measure political connections. The results of multiple linear 
regressions show that: (1) there is no significant relationship between political 
connections based on government officials, but the correlation coefficient is negative. 
We guess that one of possible reasons is the interference of private companies which 
are not pure. (2) Political connections based on NPC deputy or members of CPPCC 
increase the significance of accounting earnings on its impact to stock price. 
This study broadens the field of political connections’ impacts, provides 
















transitional economic system, and enriches the study results on political cost 
motivation of earnings management. 
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1.1 问题的提出与研究意义 













的一种有利工具（陈冬华，2003；Li et al，2008；吴文锋等，2008；姜跃龙，2008）。 
企业与政府之间存在的这种关系并非仅仅存在于我国。研究已证实，企业的
政治联系在世界范围内是普遍存在的。Faccio(2006a)发现在其研究的 47 个国家



















































                                                   
①分别摘自《南方周末》2007 年 5 月 10 日的《民营企业主竞逐各级党代表》和《中国青年报》2008 年 2 月
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如 Adhikari et al.（2006）以政府拥有公司的股权比例来衡量马来西亚公司的政治
联系，Claessens et al.（2008）以公司对巴西候选人的捐赠金额来衡量政治联系，
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